The Exclusive Utilization Space: A New Approach to the Management and Utilization of the Near Space by Liu, Hao & Tronchetti, Fabio
 
537 
THE EXCLUSIVE UTILIZATION SPACE:   
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT AND 
UTILIZATION OF THE NEAR SPACE 
HAO LIU* & FABIO TRONCHETTI** 
ABSTRACT 
 
Near space operations represent some of the most challenging 
yet promising future uses of the aerospace.  Attracted by their 
envisioned high profitability, governmental and non-governmental 
entities have shown a growing interest in placing high-altitude 
vehicles in the near space to provide various types of services, such 
as telecommunication and internet access.  Despite these 
possibilities, near space plans are impeded by the uncertain legal 
status of the near space, which pose regulatory challenges to the 
development of near space services. 
In order to promote the beginning of a near space era, this 
Article suggests a new categorization of the near space as the 
Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS).  Drawing inspiration from the 
precedent of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Article 
proposes a series of basic principles intended to facilitate the 
management of the near space and to clarify the rights and duties 
of the entities involved in its utilization.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Near space operations represent the future of activities in the 
airspace.  Indeed, thanks to technological leaps, the capability to 
carry out operations at altitudes between 18 and 100 kilometers 
(from 59,005 to 328,083 feet), the so-called “near space,” to provide 
communication, navigation, sensing, internet, and other services, is 
rapidly becoming a reality.1  The significance of this fact should not 
be underestimated because, until now, activities have taken place 
either at lower altitudes (the core of civil aviation operations takes 
place below 38,000 feet above sea level) or in outer space (namely, 
beyond the altitude of 100 kilometers). 
Already two decades ago, various attempts to perform long-
duration high-altitude activities were undertaken in the United 
States.2  These efforts were, however, mostly unsuccessful3 and did 
not lead to marketable products.4  Recently, the near space has 
once again attracted the attention of investors and several projects, 
                                                             
 1 For a review of these technologies, see generally ALEJANDRO ARAGÓN-
ZAVALA, JOSÉ LUIS CUEVAS-RUÍZ & JOSÉ  ANTONIO DELGADO-PENÍN, HIGH-ALTITUDE 
PLATFORMS FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS (2008), which provides an overview on  
high-altitude platforms; Flavio Araripe d’Oliveira, Francisco Cristovão Lourenço 
de Melo & Tessaleno Campos Devezas, High-Altitude Platforms—Present Situation 
and Technology Trends, 8 J. AEROSP. TECHNOL. MANAG. 249 (2016), which surverys 
the history of high-altitude platforms and the current trends and challenges; 
Stylianos Karapantazis & Fotini-Niovi Pavlidou, Broadband Communications Via 
High-Altitude Platforms: A Survey, 7 IEEE COMM. SURVS. & TUTORIALS 2 (2005), 
which examines communication aspects of High-Altitude Platforms; Toshiaki 
Tsujii, Masatoshi Harigae & Masashi Harada, Navigation and Positioning System 
Using High Altitude Platforms Systems (HAPS), 52 J. JAPAN SOC’Y AERONAUTICAL 
SPACE SCI. 175 (2004); and Emanuela Falletti, Massimaliano Laddomada, Marina 
Mondin & Fabrizio Sellone, Integrated Services from High-Altitude Platforms: A 
Flexible Communication System, IEEE COMM. MAG., Feb. 2006, which analyzes a 
flexible communication  system for high-altitude-platform-based communication, 
in particular the delivery of broadband services to high-speed trains. 
 2 See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note 1, at 251–56 (describing various 
research and development projects over the past 20 years). 
 3 See ARAGÓN-ZAVALA ET AL., supra note 1, at 20–25 (reviewing examples of 
unsuccessful projects such as SkyStation and Halo, the former aimed at placing 
solar-powered high-altitude platforms at altitudes around 21 kilometers to 
provide wireless communication services, the latter planned to deploy airplanes at 
similar altitudes to offer broadband communication). 
 4 See id. at 23; Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 65, 94–100 (2007). 
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including the development of various kinds of high-altitude 
platforms, have been launched.  Interestingly enough, the media 
has covered these initiates with significant interest.5  For example, 
in 2013 the U.S. company Google X (now simply “X”) announced 
Project Loon, aimed at creating an aerial wireless network through 
the placement of balloons at altitudes between 18 to 25 kilometers.6  
Similarly, in 2014, Facebook unveiled the Facebook Internet project 
which intended to develop a high-altitude network of solar-
powered, unmanned aircraft to furnish Internet capability to 
underserved areas.7 
Asian-based entities are also actively engaged in near space 
initiatives.  For instance, the Chinese company Kuang-Chi is 
developing helium-filled balloons and other kinds of lighter-than-
air vehicles to furnish aerial surveillance, communication, near 
space tourism, and wireless Wi-Fi transmission to remote areas.8 
                                                             
 5 See, e.g., Will Oremus, Not as Loony as it Sounds, SLATE (Dec. 2, 2014, 1:21 
PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/12/project_loon_
how_google_s_internet_balloons_are_actually_working.html 
[https://perma.cc/W442-H6TH]; Tom Simonite, Billions of People Could Get Online 
for the First Time Thanks to Helium Balloons That Google Will Soon Send Over Many 
Places Cell Towers Don’t Reach, MIT TECH. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2015, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/534986/project-loon/ 
[https://perma.cc/N4B5-QBGH]. 
 6 See  LOON, https://loon.co/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (providing an 
overview of the company’s activities) [https://perma.cc/YX4S-TUK3]; David 
Lumb, Project Loon Delivers Internet to 100,000 People in Puerto Rico, ENGADGET 
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/11/09/project-loon-delivers-
internet-100-000-people-puerto-rico/ [https://perma.cc/MEF5-JMCK] (noting 
that in October 2017 the X company was able to provide immediate Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) coverage to Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria).  
Furthermore, X concluded an agreement in 2016 with Sri Lanka to provide full 
internet coverage using LTE.  See Google’s Internet Ballons  Project Hits 
Turbulence in Sri Lanka, NATIONAL (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.thenational.ae/business/google-s-internet-ballons-project-hits-
turbulence-in-sri-lanka-1.638993 [https://perma.cc/2977-6CXQ]. 
 7 See Jessi Hempel, Inside Facebook’s Ambitious Plan to Connect the Whole World, 
WIRED (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/facebook-zuckerberg-
internet-org/ [https://perma.cc/L7UV-M95U]. 
 8 For further information about Kuang-Chi, see KUANG-CHI, 
http://www.kuang-chi.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/3X3D-9HKC] (last visited 
Jan, 25, 2019), which details the activities of Kuang-Chi;  Press Release, Kuang-
Chi,  Traveler Will Be Launched in the Southern Hemisphere (Mar. 23, 2015), 
http://www.kuang-chi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=read&did=1003 
[https://perma.cc/R43M-ECTB], which reveals that on November 21, 2014, 
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Three factors are contributing to the growing attention toward 
the near space.  First, its use is expected to be profitable.  Analysis 
reveals that the high-altitude platform market should grow at an 
annual rate of 8.7 percent and reach a value of $4.77 billion by 
2023.9  Secondly, the near space offers several opportunities for 
start-up companies and newcomers.10  Conversely, traditional 
areas of operation, such as the airspace and outer space, lack 
similar conditions, with both environments experiencing growing 
levels of congestion11 and competition.12  Thirdly, high-altitude 
platforms are cheaper to launch and operate than satellites.13 
                                                             
Kuang-Chi signed a joint memorandum with Airways New Zealand to enable the 
launch of a near space commercial platform called Traveler from New Zealand 
territory; and Press Release, Kuang-Chi, Traveler Launched in New Zealand (June 
8, 2015), http://www.kuang-
chi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=read&did=1004 [https://perma.cc/7FKU-
BW4K], which announces that the Traveler was successfully launched on June 6, 
2015.  See also Wen-Qin Wang & Dingde Jiang, Integrated Wireless Sensor Systems 
via Near Space and Satellite Platforms: A Review, 14 IEEE SENSORS J. 3903–3914 
(providing technical information about the use of wireless sensor systems in the 
near space). 
 9 See High Altitude Platforms (Airships, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and 
Tethered Aerostat Systems), Market-Global Industry Analysis, Size, Share, Growth, 
Trends and Forecast 2015–2023, TRANSPARENCY MKT. RES. (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/high-altitude-platforms-
technologies.html. 
 10 See Ned Allen, Our Strategic Space Shore: Opportunities in Near Space, 31 
AEROSPACE AM. 45 (2007) (suggesting that the near space presents a strategic 
opportunity for the United States because it is an “aggressive environment” and it 
little used by others). 
 11 Paul Stephen Dempsey & Kevin O’Connor, Air Traffic Congestion and 
Infrastructure Development in the Pacific Asia Region, in ASIA PACIFIC AIR TRANSPORT: 
CHALLENGES AND POLICY REFORMS CONFERENCE 23–25 (Christopher Findlay, Chia 
Lin Sien & Karmjit Singh eds., 1997) (discussing current levels of congestion in 
Pacific Asia); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 164–71 
(2008); Justin T. Barkowski, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and—
Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 247 (2010) (asking how we can efficiently manage 
the need for open skies). 
 12 See NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2010), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_polic
y_6-28-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BGP-R5ZW] (discussing the increasing 
importance of and activity in outer space). 
 13 See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note 1, at 260; PAUL DEMPSEY & MARIA 
MANOLI, SUBORBITAL FLIGHTS AND THE DELIMITATION OF AIR SPACE VIS-A’-VIS OUTER 
SPACE: FUNCTIONALISM, SPATIALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, at 43–44, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.9, U.N. Sales No. V.18-01929(E) (2018), 
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Despite these positive elements, near space commercial 
operations are still hampered by technical and legal obstacles.  On 
one side, it is still technically challenging to sustain long-term 
activities in the near space.  Particularly problematic are aspects 
related to energy storage, the strength of lightweight structures, 
and the overall reliability of vehicles.14  On the other side, the legal 
status of the near space remains uncertain.  Due to the fact that no 
international law specifically regulates it, the legal nature of the 
near space as well as the rules applicable therein remain doubtful.15 
Importantly, while efforts to solve the technical difficulties 
impeding operation in the near space are being undertaken,16 no 
comprehensive action to clarify its legal regime is being carried 
out.  This Article argues that this state of being is no longer 
sustainable.  Indeed, the present uncertainty harms business plans 
and innovation because it renders the permissibility of an activity, 
the modalities of its implementation, and its possible revenues, 
questionable.  The current legal environment is particularly 
detrimental to near space projects of an international nature,17 
                                                             
http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac_105c_22018cr
p/aac_105c_22018crp_9_0_html/AC105_C2_2018_CRP09E.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96BK-URFV] (discussing the use of high-altitude platforms); 
see also Leonard David, Sky Treck to the ‘Near Space’ Neighborood, SPACE  (Nov. 9, 
2005), https://www.space.com/1761-sky-trek-space-neighborhood.html 
[https://perma.cc/BE8N-CP7N]; How Close are High-Altitude Platforms to 
Competing with Satellites, SPACENEWS (Oct. 26, 2017) 
https://spacenews.com/how-close-are-high-altitude-platforms-to-competing-
with-satellites/ [https://perma.cc/DYE6-2Q5J]; Near Space: The Shore of Our New 
Ocean, HOBBYSPACE, http://www.hobbyspace.com/NearSpace/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z2LU-558L] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
 14 For more information on these technical challenges, see Araripe d’Oliveira 
et al., supra note 1, at 258–60, which details the technological challenges of 
lightweight structures, thermal management, operation at low altitude, and 
reliability. 
 15 See infra Section 2.3. 
 16 See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note 1, at 260 (citing the investment in 
high- altitude platform projects and the evolution of new technology); DAVID 
GRACE & MIHAEL MOHORČIČ, BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS VIA HIGH-ALTITUDE 
PLATFORMS 5 (2011) (“[g]iven the state of maturity of the different HAP vehicles, a 
step-by-step development approach is now being pursued by organizations, with 
the aim of generating confidence, develop the technology, and perhaps more 
importantly provide revenue streams for manufacturers.”). 
 17 For examples of these international projects, see Karapantazis & Pavlidou, 
supra note 1, at 5; and Nicholas J. Colella & James N. Martin, High Speed Internet 
Access via Stratospheric HALO Aircraft, 
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namely those involving the deployment of a system of vehicles, 
platforms, transmitters, and various links in the near space above 
foreign territories to offer wireless communication and other 
services.18  These ventures are envisioned to generate high profits.19  
Nevertheless, it is precisely in that context that the unclear legal 
relationship between the states above which the high-altitude 
vehicles are placed and the operators of those vehicles—together 
with issues related to sovereignty and security—compromises 
these ventures. 
Thus, it is evident that the implementation of near space plans 
faces numerous obstacles.  In an attempt to ameliorate this 
situation, this Article suggests a new legal classification of the near 
                                                             
https://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/4d/4d_3.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6D25-Q7T6] (last visited Jan, 25, 2019), which describes the 
Angel Technologies Corporation’s project that intends to provide high-speed 
internet access via stratospheric HALO aircraft deployed at 51,000 feet.  Another 
kind of project is proposed by companies like Airborne Wireless Network (AWN) 
that plan to operate a high-speed broadband airborne wireless network by linking 
commercial aircraft in flight.  Essentially, AWN wants to place its broadband 
transceivers on a critical mass of airborne aircraft and use equipped aircraft as 
signal repeaters capable of providing wireless signals all over the world.  See 
Woodrow Bellamy III, This Company Plans to Turn Airplanes into Communications 
Satellites, VIA SATELLITE (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://www.satellitetoday.com//telecom/2017/02/08/company-plans-turn-
airplanes-communications-satellites/ [https://perma.cc/3XFD-QQAA] 
(describing AWN and its plan called the “Infinitus Super Highway”); AIRBORNE 
WIRELESS NETWORK, http://www.airbornewirelessnetwork.com/index.asp 
[https://perma.cc/L8HQ-X7TS] (last visited Jan, 25, 2019) (explaining more about 
the company). 
 18 For examples of these projects, see Eric C. Cook, Broad Area Wireless 
Networking via High Altitude Platforms (2013) (unpublished master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/34648/13Jun_Cook_Eric.pdf?s
equence=1 [https://perma.cc/3MEQ-TV8D], which discusses developing 
technologies aiming to  provide broad-area wireless networking to support 
military operations; and  Zhe Yang & Abbas Mohammed, High Altitude Platforms 
for Wireless Mobile Communication Applications, in MOBILE AND WIRELESS 
COMMUNICATIONS: PHYSICAL LAYER DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 47–56 
(Salma Ait Fares & Fumiyuki Adachi eds., 2010), which details various 
international high-altitude platform projects. 
 19 Indeed, several states, although not possessing near space technology nor 
intending to develop it, are still interested in benefiting from near space services 
and allowing their population to access it.  See Araripe d’Oliveira et al., supra note 
1, at 252–58 (describing various international projects and partnerships); ARAGÓN-
ZAVALA ET AL., supra note 1, at 23–25 (discussing European high-altitude platform 
projects). 
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space as the “Exclusive Utilization Space” (EUS).  Accordingly, the 
legal status of the near space should be distinguished from that of 
national airspace and outer space.  Essentially, under the EUS 
proposal, the space located approximately between the altitude of 
18 to 100 kilometers (between 59,005 to 328,083 feet), now labeled 
the Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS), should lay outside of 
national sovereignty and be governed by basic rules intended to 
maximize its profitable use and orderly management.  This 
approach would: a) stimulate technological development and 
investments in the near space sector; b) eliminate unnecessary 
obstacles to the international utilization of the near space; c) put in 
place a level playing field for operators; d) allow a substantial 
number of countries and users to benefit from it; e) clarify the legal 
status of the near space; and f) establish the rights and duties of the 
states and entities that use it. 
The EUS proposal is not intended to undermine the sovereign 
rights and the security interests of the state above which territory 
an Exclusive Utilization Space would be located, a state which we 
can call the “underlying State.”  On the contrary, while the EUS 
would not be part of its territory, such a State would maintain 
several sovereign prerogatives over it, including the right to: a) 
choose if and how to establish the EUS; b) use the EUS on a priority 
basis; c) negotiate the conditions to be complied with by foreign 
entities; and d) enforce safety and security matters in relation to the 
operations of domestic and foreign entities.  Overall, the EUS idea 
aims at balancing the sovereign interests of the underlying State 
with the creation of economic opportunities for domestic and 
foreign operators. 
The EUS proposal draws inspiration from the concept of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as provided in the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention.  Notwithstanding the differences between the 
two, there are several characteristics of the EEZ that, if adequately 
modified, can be used as a model to shape the legal regime of EUS. 
The Article will first describe the legal status of the near space 
and the core elements of the Exclusive Utilization Zone; then, it 
will elaborate upon the constitutive elements of the Exclusive 
Utilization proposal. 
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2.  THE NEAR SPACE:  A DESCRIPTION 
2.1.  The issue of delimitation 
The near space is located between the airspace and outer 
space.20  Indeed, due to its physical characteristics, it naturally 
divides these two zones because neither traditional civil aviation 
activities nor space operations can be carried out therein.21  On one 
hand, commercial passenger aircrafts can safely fly up to the 
altitude of 12 kilometers (38,000 feet);22 beyond that point the air 
                                                             
 20 See generally Ruth Stilwell, The First 100KM, the Case for Integrated Space 
and Aviation Policy and Governance, in SPACE SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT 561–70 
(Tommaso Sgobba & Isabelle Rongier eds., 2015) (positing that in addressing 
policy questions about access and priority of airspace, the international 
community should try to balance the competing demands of civil aviation and 
commercial space operators); Joseph N. Pelton, A New Integrated Global 
Regulatory Regime for Air and Space: The Needs for Safety Standards for the Protozone 
(Second Manfred Lachs International Conference on Global Space Governance, 
Montreal, May 2014); Matthew T. King, Sovereignty’s Grey Area: The Delimitation of 
Air and Space in the Context of Aerospace Vehicles and the Use of Force,  81 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 377 (2016) (noting that the line between the “disparate legal regimes” of 
airspace and outer space will be tested by the development of aerospace 
vehicles that can operate in and transition between the  two). 
 21 See, e.g., FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 163 
(2009) (noting the history of the policy arguments for dividing the spaces); 
Jinyuan Su, Near Space as a Sui Generis Zone: A Tri-Layer Approach of Delimitation, 
29 SPACE POL’Y 90 (2013) (“The lack of a legal boundary between air space and 
outer space has not given rise to significant difficulties in the determination of 
applicable law with respect to traditional flight craft – aircraft and space objects – 
due to their separated sphere of activities.”); Joseph N. Pelton, Urgent Security 
Concerns in the Protozone, Presentation at the Fourth Manfred Lachs 
International Conference on Global Space Governance (May 2016), 
https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/mlc4_presentation_j_pelton.pptx 
[https://perma.cc/BHE5-VDE8] (noting the need for space legal experts to 
formally consider the area above commercial airspace and below the area that can 
allow satellites to stay in orbit); King, supra note 20, at 403 (explaining that the 
current spacial definition is guided by physical, scientific, or natural attributes, 
not law or policy). 
 22 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not allow commercial 
aircraft to exceed the altitude of 40,000 feet (MSL) unless the structure is certified 
to not have any type of decompression.  See generally U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
FAA AC NO. 61-107B, AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AT ALTITUDES ABOVE 25,000 FEET MEAN 
SEA LEVEL OR MACH NUMBERS GREATER THAN .75 (Mar. 29, 2013), 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/do
cument.information/documentID/1020859 [https://perma.cc/96CC-YF94]. 
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becomes increasingly less dense until the moment where either the 
wings cannot generate sufficient lift, or the engines cannot produce 
enough thrust.23  Additionally, air navigation services cannot be 
effectively carried out beyond the altitude of around 18 to 20 
kilometers above sea level (between 59,005 to 328,083 feet), the so-
called Flight Level (FL) 600.  The existing air navigation 
technologies have not yet been adapted to function in the near 
space.24  On the other hand, the altitude of 100 kilometers (328,083 
feet) represents the unofficial starting point of outer space because 
at around that altitude the atmosphere becomes too thin to support 
aeronautical flight and a vehicle needs to travel faster than orbital 
velocity to derive sufficient aerodynamic lift to sustain itself.25  
Significantly, some states have indicated 100 kilometers (328,083 
feet) as the point separating the national airspace from outer space.  
For instance, Australia,26 Kazakhstan,27 and Denmark28 have 
                                                             
 23 See King, supra note 20, at 407, 411 (discussing the fundamental aspects, 
physical and legal, of the space and air domains); Rebecca Maksel, Who Holds the 
Altitude Record for an Airplane?, AIR & SPACE MAG. (May 28, 2009), 
https://www.airspacemag.com/need-to-know/who-holds-the-altitude-record-
for-an-airplane-141522931/ [https://perma.cc/N2QM-7ZHM]. 
 24 For the purpose of air traffic control, domestic airspace is divided into 
different categories, such as controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other 
airspace.  See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA-H-8083-25B, PILOT’S HANDBOOK OF 
AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE 15-1 – 15-12 (2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak
/media/17_phak_ch15.pdf [https://perma.cc/82WV-FXHC] (describing the 
categories and subcategories of airspace); Airspace, THE LOGBOOK (Aug. 1, 2012, 
4:59 PM), http://herschlogbook.blogspot.com/2012/08/airspace.html 
[https://perma.cc/8MXB-VB7X] (diagramming the classifications).  Generally, 
domestic regulations apply to a maximum altitude of Flight Level (FL) 600, 
approximately 60,000 feet (18,000 meters).  See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
NY/NJ/PHL AIRSPACE REDESIGN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. A 
(July 2007), 
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas/nynjphl_redesign/documentation/feis/m
edia/Appendix_A-National_Airspace_System_Overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82WV-FXHC] (identifying airspace classifications and 
terminology). 
 25 In practice, Low Earth Orbit satellites (Low Earth Orbit consists of the 
orbits located between 150 to 2000 kilometers or 6,561,679 feet of altitude) are 
normally placed at a minimum level of 160 kilometers (524,934 feet) because 
below that altitude satellites enter a state of orbital decay caused by the 
atmospheric drag.  Low Earth Orbit is an orbit around the Earth with an altitude 
of 2000 km (524,934 feet).  See CLAUDE NICOLLIER & ROGER-MAURICE BONNET, 
OUTER SPACE ENVIRONMENT, OPPORTUNITIES, STAKES AND DANGERS 4 (2015). 
 26 See Space Activities Act 1998, (Cth) pt 2 (Austl.) (defining “space object” as 
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enacted national space legislation applicable to activities occurring 
at an altitude of 100 kilometers or higher. 
Overall, even though international law does not set the precise 
spatial delimitation of the near space, there is a general 
understanding of where its boundaries lie. 
2.2.  Legal regime of the near space 
Legal scholars disagree as to the legal status of the near space.  
Such a controversy derives from the lack of international treaties 
regulating it.  Thus, one can safely say that the near space 
represents a grey area in international law. 
From a legal perspective, the key issue is whether the near 
space should be considered as part of the airspace or outer space, 
or if it should be deemed to have a separate legal status.  In the 
absence of a guidance provided by international legal instruments 
specifically governing it, the most viable approach seems to be the 
analysis of air and space law conventions.  While these conventions 
do not specifically regulate the near space, they may provide useful 
elements to ascertain the legal regime applicable therein. 
The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(commonly referred to as the Chicago Convention)29 is the 
fundamental instrument of the public international air law system.  
The Convention, which is widely ratified, establishes the pivotal 
rules regulating international transportation by air.30 
                                                             
“a payload (if any) that the launch vehicle is to carry into or back from an area 
beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level.”). 
 27 See LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON SPACE ACTIVITIES ch. 1, art. 1 
(2012) (defining “cosmic space” as  “the space, extending beyond the air space at a 
height of more than one hundred kilometers above sea level.”). 
 28 See DANISH OUTER SPACE ACT pt. II (2016) (defining “outer space” as “Space 
above the altitude of 100km above sea level.”). 
 29 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 43, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
 30 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at 41–65 
(overviewing the 1944 Chicago Convention); Michael Milde, The Chicago 
Convention – After Forty Years, 9 ANN.  AIR & SPACE L. 119 (1984) (calling the 
Chicago Convention the “cornerstone of legal regulation of international civil 
aviation for the past forty years”); Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (2014) (analyzing the provisions of the treaty). 
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Article 1 of the Chicago Convention recognizes states’ complete 
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above their territory.31  
It clarifies that a state’s sovereignty extends beyond its land and 
territorial sea to also include the airspace above its territory.32  
Based on this premise, such a state is entitled to apply its laws and 
exercise its jurisdictional powers over the airspace above its 
territory.33 
The provisions of Article 1 were driven by security concerns34 
and were meant to protect the national soil from dangerous 
activities and foreign attacks.35  Accordingly, the Chicago 
Convention prohibits aircrafts from entering a foreign national 
                                                             
 31 This principle was first established in Article 1 of 1919 Paris International 
Convention on Air Navigation that recognized that “every Power has complete 
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”  Convention on 
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation art. 1, Oct. 13, 1919, 297 LNTS 173.  For an 
overview of the period between the 1919 Paris Convention to the 1944 Chicago 
Convention, see Malgorzata Polkowska, The Development of Air Law: From the Paris 
Conference of 1910 to the Chicago Convention of 1944, 33 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 59 
(2008); and P. Dupont, L’Espace Aérien entre Souveraineté 220 R.F.D.A.S. 13 (2004). 
 32 For an analysis of Article 1 of the Chicago Convention and the concept of 
sovereignty applied to national airspace, see King, supra note 20, at 407; DEMPSEY, 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at 44; Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 69–
76; John Cobb Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxi “Cuius est Solum” in International 
Air Law, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 54–102 (Ivan A. 
Vlasic ed., 1968); F. Lyall, The Maxim “Cuius est Solum” in Scots Law, 147 JUR. REV. 
69 (1978); and Herbert David Klein, Cuius est Solum, Eius Est . . . Quousque 
Tandem?, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 237 (1959). 
 33 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (1994) (“The United States Government has 
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”); 19 C.F.R. 122.49b(a) 
(defining the term “Territorial Airspace of the United States” as the airspace over 
the United States, its territories, and possessions, and the airspace over the 
territorial waters between the United States coast and 12 nautical miles from the 
coast”). 
 34 See John C. Cooper, United States Participation in the Drafting of the Paris 
Convention, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 266, 267 (1951) (“A very considerable part of the 
work of this Commission was devoted to military problems, particularly the effort 
to prevent or limit German air rearmament after the conclusion of peace.”); D. 
Goedhuis, Civil Aviation After the War, 36 AM. J. INT’L LAW 596 (1942) (asking 
whether World War I brought about a change in states’ relaxed policy toward 
aviation regulations); D. Goedhuis, Sovereignty and Freedom in the Airspace, 41 
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 137 (1955) (noting historical defenses of the idea of 
freedom of air). 
 35 See Abeyratne, supra note 30, at 14 (explaining the good governance 
required for the proper running of a state). 
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airspace without prior authorization by special agreement.36  Aside 
from enjoying several rights, states’ parties have the obligation to 
ensure the safety of aircrafts transiting through their national 
airspace37 and to manage air traffic pursuant to the ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).38 
Significantly for our discussion, the Chicago Convention does 
not establish a vertical limit to state sovereignty.  Consequently, 
what is the upward limit of a state’s territory (or quasi-territory), 
and whether the near space is included in it, remains unanswered.  
In this regard, two views have been put forward.  The first claims 
that a state’s sovereignty extends vertically with no limits until the 
point where outer space begins.  This view originates from the old 
Latin maxim “cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum,” which 
means: “Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky,” or in more simple 
terms: “He who possesses the land possesses also that which is 
above it.”  Under this construct, the near space would be part of a 
state’s national airspace and subject to its laws and control.  In 
1906, Prof. Westlake advocated, “[i]f there exists a limit as to the 
sovereignty of the State over the oceanic space, none exists for the 
                                                             
 36 See Chicago Convention, supra note 29, arts. 3, 6.  For further restricting 
measures on access and use of the airspace in the U.S., see FAA, AIRSPACE 
RESTRICTIONS, https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/airspace_restrictions/ 
[https://perma.cc/RYC5-E9PH]. 
 37 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at 164–203; 
Roxanne Zolin & Ira Lewis, Air Navigation Services and the United States: A 
Comparative Case Study, in MACROTHINK INSTITUTE CASE STUDIES IN BUSINESS AND 
MANAGEMENT 96 (2014) (comparing air navigation services in Australia and the 
United States); Performance of Air Navigation Services (International Civil Aviation 
rganization Working Paper ATConf/6-WP/52, Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-
wp052-
2_en.pdf?TSPD_101_R0=37676aabab1d818626cd0a0284b62248sf3000000000000000
073edcf3cffff00000000000000000000000000005936250a0039bd337d 
[https://perma.cc/K55M-2MFE] (discussing developments in European air 
navigation services). 
 38 The term “SARPs” is used by ICAO to refer to the technical specifications 
adopted by its Council to achieve to achieve “the highest practicable degree of 
uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to 
aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such 
uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.”  Chicago Convention, supra 
note 29, art. 37; see also DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 11, at 
61–65. 
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sovereignty of the State over the air space.”39  The second view 
proposes a more technical approach based on the ability of a state 
to effectively provide air navigation services.  Accordingly, the 
national airspace should extend vertically as high as a state can 
enforce its sovereignty.40  For example, Prof. Cooper claimed, “[The 
Chicago Convention] deals with no areas of space other than those 
parts of the atmosphere where the gaseous air is sufficiently dense 
to support balloons and airplanes.”41  Therefore, under this 
approach, the near space would not be part of the national 
airspace, as states cannot sufficiently perform air navigation 
services therein. 
Evidently, international air law does not clarify the legal status 
of the near space.  The picture is not clearer when analysis switches 
to international space law.  First, the space treaties regulate 
activities occurring in space properly considered.  Therefore, their 
scope goes beyond the area usually referred to as “near space.”42  
Second, international space law fails to even set the physical lower 
border of outer space.  Hence, it leaves uncertain the question on 
how to delimitate outer space from the airspace.  Notably, since the 
early days of space activities, states have not managed to agree on 
a criterion to separate airspace and outer space.43  The sections 
above the 100 km mark have been referred to as the lower border 
of outer space.  However, such a view is not universally accepted. 
                                                             
 39 John C. Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, in 
EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS BY JOHN COBB COOPER 1946–
1966 256, 258 (Ivan A. Vlasic ed., 1968) (quoting Westlake). 
 40 See H.B. Jacobini, Effective Control as Related to the Extension of Sovereignty in 
Space, 7 J. PUB. L. 97, 115 (1958) (“[i]n regard to the extension of national 
sovereignty over territorial space, the upper limits of this jurisdiction will be 
determined by the extent upward to which the subjacent state can exert effective 
control . . . .”). 
 41 John C. Cooper, Legal Problems of Upper Space, 50 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
85, 88 (1956). 
 42 International space law regulates the activities of objects launched into 
outer space, either in Earth orbit or beyond. 
 43 On the issue of delimitation between airspace and outer space, see LYALL 
& LARSEN, supra note 21, at 153; Thomas Cheney & Lauren Napier, Policy Analysis: 
Air versus Space, Where Do Suborbital Flights Fit into International Regulations?, 7 J. 
SCI. POL’Y & GOV. 1 (2015) (discussing the regulation of suborbital flight); D.B. 
Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. AIR L. & COM. 384 (1957) 
(examining national sovereignty in light of technological developments in space 
exploration); and Cooper, supra note 41. 
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Overall, it is clear that neither international air law nor space 
law clarify the legal nature of the near space.  Under these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to look elsewhere to find useful 
elements to address the matter.  In this regard the analysis of 
national initiatives, particularly the adoption of national laws 
governing activities in the near space, might be useful.  Indeed, the 
existence of similar laws could give room to argue that the near 
space is part of the national airspace.  Regrettably, the study of 
similar laws does not provide a satisfactory picture.  Only one 
state, New Zealand, has passed legislation specifically regulating 
near space activities.  Other states have only addressed operations 
occurring below the 20 km altitude mark and have not answered 
the question of the upward delimitation of their national airspace. 
The New Zealand Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities 
Act was enacted on December, 21, 201744 with the purposes of: a) 
regulating space activities as well as high-altitude activities; b) 
facilitating the development of a space industry.45  The drafting of 
the Act was motivated by the advantages of using portions of the 
largely uninhabited New Zealand territory to test and launch 
rockets and high-altitude vehicles. 
Regrettably, the Act falls short of providing a clear regulation 
of high-altitude activities.  It defines “high altitude” as being above 
flight level 600 (FL 600) (which is normally located at around 18 km 
(59,005 feet))46 and being above the highest upper limit of 
controlled airspace (which is usually established at 2.9 km (around 
9,500 feet)).47  However, as the Act does not set the upper limit of 
                                                             
 44 Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017 (N.Z.), 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0029/45.0/DLM6966275.html 
[https://perma.cc/X8X9-JCHE] (laying out license requirements for launches and 
high-altitude activities). 
 45 For an analysis of the drafting of the Act, see Gareth Hughes, Outer Space 
and High-Altitude Activities Bill—Third Reading, GREEN (July 6, 2017, 11:38 AM), 
https://www.greens.org.nz/news/speech/gareth-hughes-outer-space-and-high-
altitude-activities-bill-third-reading [https://perma.cc/6K9P-GGGF]. 
 46 Stephen K. Hunter, Safe Operations Above FL600 (Space Traffic 
Management Conference, 2015), 
https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=stm 
[https://perma.cc/C3WS-8GGR]. 
 47 See Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 1, s 4 
(“Interpretation”); see also Hunter, supra note 46. 
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the high-altitude areas, the extent to which its high-altitude 
provisions apply remains doubtful. , 
The Act states that a person: “must not launch a high-altitude 
vehicle from New Zealand . . . unless the person has a high- 
altitude license for the launch.”48  A launch license is also required 
to launch objects into outer space.49  However, in the absence of a 
precise delimitation between where outer space begins and the 
high-altitude area ends, doubts remain as to which of the two 
licenses should be at stake in any given case.  Importantly, a high-
altitude license is linked to the use of a “high-altitude vehicle,” 
which is defined as “an aircraft or any other vehicle that travels, is 
intended to travel, or is capable of travelling to high altitude.”50  
This definition still does not clarify when an altitude would be 
high enough to constitute outer space. 
Apart from New Zealand, no other states have specifically 
regulated near space activities.  Instead, their attention has been 
focused on the implementation of air navigation services above 
their territory.  These services are provided only up to the so-called 
Flight Level 600 (FL 600).  As a large majority of states have not 
enacted rules applicable beyond FL 600, one can argue that the 
altitude around 18 km constitutes the upper limit of national 
airspace.  Under this construct, anything located above that point, 
including the near space, would consequently lay outside of state 
sovereignty.  However, there are also states that, while not having 
legislated beyond FL 600, have kept this possibility open.  For 
example, in the United States, the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s authority formally extends up to FL 600.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it ends at FL 600.  Federal 
Aviation Regulations Section 71.71, Class E airspace, describes 
what FAA authority exists above FL 600 by defining Class E 
airspace as: “The airspace of the United States, including that 
airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles of the coast 
of the 48 contiguous states and Alaska, extending upward from 
14,500 feet MSL up to, but not including 18,000 feet MSL, and the 
                                                             
 48 Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 2, s 45 
(“Requirement for high-altitude license”). 
 49 Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 2, s 7 (“Launch of 
launch vehicle from New Zealand requires launch license”). 
 50 Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017, pt 1, s 4. 
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airspace above FL600 . . . .”51  Furthermore, 49 U.S. Code § 40103, 
provides that: “The Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration shall develop plans and policy for the use of the 
navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the 
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient 
use of airspace.”52 
Thus, the FAA has the authority to regulate air traffic from over 
the United States from just above the surface to a point where the 
atmosphere becomes too thin to support aeronautical flight.53  In 
short, the United States considers its national airspace to extend 
beyond FL 600, even though U.S. legislation does not set a precise 
vertical limit to it. 
The uncertain legal nature of the near space is further 
reinforced by the nature of near space vehicles that cannot be 
assimilated to either aircraft or spacecraft.  While these vehicles are 
capable of certain flying maneuvers, their maneuverability and 
performance cannot be assimilated to that of an aircraft.54  Further, 
a space object is specifically designed to be launched and operated 
in outer space, two characteristics that near space vehicles do not 
possess.  Indeed, they are usually meant to remain stationary at 
altitudes much lower than outer space.55 
In sum, the legal status of the near space is highly 
controversial.  One can claim that the near space belongs to a 
                                                             
 51 14 C.F.R. § 71.71 (2018). 
 52 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (1994). 
 53 See generally DEMPSEY & MANOLI, supra note 13, at 17 (noting a distance 
between 80 and 90 km above the surface of the Earth as “the point after which the 
aircraft functions cannot be maintained, for the density of the atmosphere is not 
sufficient . . . .”). 
 54 Near space vehicles can be divided into free floaters and maneuvering 
vehicles.  Free floaters’ flying speed and direction depend mostly on existing 
winds, even though they are also capable of limited steering that enables them to 
float at different altitudes and take advantage of different wind directions and 
speed.  In contrast, maneuvering vehicles can use a variety of propulsion 
mechanisms to fly or keep stationary over a specific area of interest.  For example, 
high-altitude buoyant lift systems rise only to an altitude where the ambient air 
density equals the weight-to-volume ratio of the buoyant system.  See Su, supra 
note 21, at 91. 
 55 See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, RADIO REGULATIONS art. 1.66A (2016) (defining 
a High Altitude Platform Station (HAPS) as “[a] station located on an object at an 
altitude of 20 to 50 km and at a specified, nominal, fixed point relative to the 
Earth.”). 
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state’s national airspace.  In this respect, there is nothing in 
international law that prevents states from enacting legislation 
applicable to the near space above their territory.  However, it is 
also arguable that the near space lies outside of the national 
airspace.  This idea is rooted in the technical challenges and the 
physical characteristics of the near space that complicate a state’s 
ability to enforce its jurisdictional power above a certain altitude.  
Starting from these considerations, there seems to be sufficient 
elements to suggest the conferral of a new legal status to the near 
space and to establish basic rules to govern activities therein. 
3.  THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
3.1.  Historical evolution 
The formulation of the Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS) 
proposal has been influenced by the precedent of the legal regime 
applicable to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).56  Although 
there are evident differences between the near space and the EEZ, 
several EEZ rules, with proper modification, provide a useful 
precedent to regulate activities in the near space. 
Part V of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS) defines the 
EEZ as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject 
                                                             
 56 The literature on the EEZ is extensive.  See, e.g., R. CHURCHILL & V. LOVE, 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 133–152 (1999); DAVID J. ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC 
ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILES 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA (1989); Gemma Andreone, 
The Exclusive Economic Zone, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
159–180 (Donald Rothwell, Alex Odue Elferink, Karen Scott & Tim Stephens eds., 
2015) (examining the evolution of the EEZ, its juridical nature, and which legal 
regimes are applicable); BUDISLAV VUKAS, The Los Convention and Sea Boundary 
Delimitation, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: SELECTED WRITINGS 83–111 (2004) (discussing 
the delimitation of maritime zones and the LOS Convention); DONALD R. 
ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 82–97 (2010) 
(discussing the EEZ, its relation to other maritime zones, and the rights and duties 
of coastal and other states); Francis Rigaldies, La Zone Économique Exclusive dans la 
Pratique des États’, 35 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 3 (1997) (discussing types of economic 
zones and the degree to which states adhere to their jurisdiction); A SEA CHANGE: 
THE EXCLUSIVE ZONE AND GOVERNANCE INSTITUTION FOR LIVING MARINE RESOURCES 
(Syma A. Ebbin, Alf Håkon Hoel & Are K. Sydnes eds., 2005) (discussing the EEZ 
and living marine resources). 
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to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the 
rights and jurisdiction57 of the coastal State and the rights and 
freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of 
the Convention”.58  A coastal state enjoys sovereign rights to 
manage and exploit the living and non-living resources located 
within its EEZ.  These rights are, however, not exclusive in the 
sense that other states also benefit from certain limited rights and 
freedoms.59 
From a legal perspective, the EEZ is often viewed as a sui 
generis zone60 because it combines elements of the regimes relevant 
to territorial waters and the high seas. 
Historically, the concept of the EEZ derived from the initiatives 
of coastal states to expand their sovereign and jurisdictional rights 
beyond the 12 nautical miles borderline of territorial waters.61  A 
milestone in this process were the 1945 President Truman’s 
                                                             
 57 Robin R. Churchill, The Impact of State Practice on the Jurisdictional 
Framework Contained in the LOS Convention, in STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW 
OF THE SEA: THE ROLE OF THE LOS CONVENTION 91, 126 (2005). 
 58 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 55, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1834 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 59 See Francisco Orrego Vicuña, La Zone Économique Exclusive: Régime et 
Nature Juridique dans le Droit International, in 199 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE 
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–79 (1986) (discussing interpretations of 
the EEZ in light of the 1982 UN Convention on The Law of the Sea); Moira L. 
McConnell, Observations on the Law Applicable on the Continental Shelf and in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone: A Comparative View, 25 OCEAN Y.B. 221 (2011) (discussing 
varying approaches to the EEZ). 
 60 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 56, at 84; Gemma Andreone & 
Giuseppe Cataldi, Sui Generis Zones, in THE IMLI MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME LAW: THE LAW OF THE SEA 217–238 (David Joseph Attard, Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice & Norman A. Martínez Gutiérrez eds., 2014) (discussing aspects of sui 
generis zones in international doctrine and practice); FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUÑA, 
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: REGIME AND LEGAL NATURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 44 (1989) (explaining that the EEZ is considered sui generis); KWIATKOWSKA, 
supra note 56, at 5. 
 61 See McConnell, supra note 59, at 225; WINSTON C. EXTAVOUR, A STUDY OF 
THE EVOLUTION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
SEA (1979).  The territorial waters are a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 
nautical miles (22.2 km) from the baseline of a coastal state.  The territorial sea is 
considered as territory of the coastal state.  See Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; 
UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 2–3.  Under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 
the water column beyond territorial waters is considered as part of the high seas.  
See Convention on the High Seas art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 
82. 
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Proclamations, in particular the Proclamation on Coastal Fisheries 
in Certain Areas of the High Seas, that argued the need to set up 
conservation zones, under the control of the United States, in those 
areas of the high seas contiguous to the coast of the U.S., where 
fishing activities had been, or could be, developed and maintained 
on a large scale.62  Another Proclamation, namely the Proclamation 
in Respect of the Continental Shelf, declared that the resources of 
the subsoil and the sea-bed of the continental shelf beneath the 
high seas but contiguous to the coast of the U.S. belonged to the 
U.S. and had to be subject to its jurisdiction and control.63 
Other countries soon followed the U.S. precedent,64 and, thus, 
through the years the breadth of their territorial sea and the 
maritime areas in which states claimed exclusive jurisdiction on 
fishing and exploitation of living resources were expanded up to 
200 miles.  It is against this background that the negotiations on the 
EEZ started in 1972 and led to the adoption of Part V of the Law of 
the Sea Convention in 1982. 
3.2.  Core elements of the EEZ 
Articles 55 to 75 of Part V of the Law of the Sea Convention 
outline the characteristics of the EEZ.  Accordingly, the EEZ is as a 
claimable maritime zone that extends up to “200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.”65  Over 130 states have claimed an EEZ, and many 
                                                             
 62 See Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (Sept. 18, 1945) (“Policy of 
the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High 
Seas”).  For commentary on the Proclamation, see DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 333–38 (1965) (discussing diverging 
interpretations of the Proclamation); and Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, La Remise en 
Cause du Droit de la Mer, in COLLOQUE DE MONTPELLIER DE LA SCOIETE FRANÇAISE 
POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 34–35 (1973). 
 63 See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945) (“Policy of 
the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed 
of the Continental Shelf”). 
 64 See ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMS: AN ANALYSIS AND 
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS (1986); JOSÉ A. DE YTURRIAGA, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF 
FISHERIES: FROM UNCLOS 1982 TO THE PRESENTIAL SEA 5–10 (1997) (discussing the 
adaptation of the United States’ interpretation of the Proclamation). 
 65 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 57. 
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have passed legislation applicable to them.66  Importantly, the EEZ 
does not belong to the coastal state that has claimed it, even though 
such a state enjoys extensive rights to use and manage it. 
Part V distinguishes between: a) coastal states; b) other states.67  
Coastal states enjoy two types of rights: 1) sovereign rights; 2) 
jurisdictional rights.  Sovereign rights apply to both living and 
non-living resources.  First, coastal states have the right to explore, 
exploit, conserve, and manage those resources located in the water 
column, seabed and subsoil of their EEZ.68  This means that coastal 
states are conferred nearly exclusive sovereign rights to undertake 
and regulate69 fishing in their EEZ.70  Coastal states are also given 
the power to set allowable catches, the duty to preserve fisheries 
and achieve their optimal utilization71 as well as the right to 
enforce their laws and regulations.72 
In principle, a coastal state shall, through agreements, enable 
other states to have access to the surplus of its allowable catch; in 
doing so, it shall give special consideration to landlocked, 
geographically disadvantaged, and least developed states.73  In 
practice, this provision has remained largely unattended as, except 
for few marginal cases, no such agreements have been concluded.74  
                                                             
 66 In principle, states are free to claim an EEZ of lesser breadth than 200 
nautical miles and to assert less than the full arrays of rights granted by the EEZ 
regime. 
 67 For an analysis of the rights given to coastal states and other states in the 
EEZ, see Andreone, supra note 56, at 165–180; and Robert Beckham & Tara 
Davenport, The EEZ Regime: Reflections After Thirty Years, in SECURING THE OCEAN 
FOR THE NEXT GENERATION: PAPERS FROM THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE–KOREA 
INSTITUTE OF OCEAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE (Harry N. Scheiber & 
Moon Sang Kwon eds., 2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Beckman-
Davenport-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/22AF-K3NJ] (analyzing the rights given to 
coastal states and other states in the EEZ). 
 68 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 56. 
 69 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 62 (enumerating a list of areas in relation 
to which laws and regulation can be promulgated). 
 70 On the distribution of fishing rights, see Tore Henriksen & Alf Hakon 
Hoel, Determining Allocation: From Paper to Practice in the Distribution of Fishing 
Rights Between Countries, 42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 66 (2011). 
 71 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 61–62, 64, 68. 
 72 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 73. 
 73 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 62, 69–70. 
 74 See Andreone, supra note 56, at 165–66; Ivan Shearer, Ocean Management 
Challenges for the Law of the Sea in the First Decade of the 21st Century, in OCEAN 
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It is also true that other states have limited capability to enforce it 
because the coastal state decisions determining the allowable catch, 
the extent of its harvesting ability and the allocation of surpluses 
fall outside of the compulsory dispute settlement system set out in 
Part XV of the Convention.75 
As far as non-living resources are concerned, such as 
hydrocarbons and minerals, coastal states benefit from unrestricted 
rights of exploration and exploitation, without any specific 
obligation of conservation or judicious use.76  These rights are 
exclusive because coastal states have no requirement to share 
access to those resources. 
Under Article 56 of the Law of the Sea Convention, coastal 
states are also conferred three kinds of jurisdictional rights 
concerning: a) the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations, and structures; b) marine scientific research; c) the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment.  The first 
right is particularly relevant for our Article as it entails the coastal 
state’s exclusive jurisdiction to construct and operate artificial 
islands, installations, and structures for economic purposes.77  Due 
notice shall be given when constructing an artificial island or 
installations and the coastal state may, where necessary, establish 
safety zones around them.78  Furthermore, in relation to such 
islands and installations, coastal states have exclusive jurisdiction 
to enact custom, fiscal, health, safety, and immigration laws and 
regulations.79 
Pursuant to Article 58 of the Law of the Sea Convention, other 
states enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight, two rights 
                                                             
MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESPONSES 10 
(Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2004). 
 75 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 56, at 88.  On the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the Law of the Sea Convention, see Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement 
and the Law of the Sea: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 37 (1997). 
 76 On the management and utilization of non–living resources, see David M. 
Ong, Towards an International Law for Conservation of Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources 
Within the Continental Shelf, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 93 
(David Freestone, Richard Barnes & David M. Ong eds., 2006). 
 77 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 60. 
 78 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 60(3)–(4). 
 79 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 60(2). 
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typical of the high seas.80  However, these rights are less extensive 
than those exercisable on the high seas.81  Indeed, within the EEZ 
other states shall pay due regard to the rights of the coastal state 
and shall comply with the laws and regulations that such a state 
has adopted pursuant to the Convention.82  Furthermore, a coastal 
state can take measures to ensure compliance by foreign vessels of 
such laws. 
3.3.  The EEZ as a model for the utilization of the near space? 
Notwithstanding the differences between the EEZ and the near 
space, for instance the fact that the former deals with the 
management and utilization of living and non-living resources, 
while the latter does not contain resources per se, it is undeniable 
that there are similarities between the two.  First, the near space 
and the sea adjacent to the territorial sea, as regulated prior to the 
entry into force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, share two 
characteristics: a) they arguably lay beyond national boundaries; 
and b) they lack an internationally recognized legal status.  
Secondly, activities in both areas face technological and economic 
challenges.  Long-term and sustainable operations require constant 
technological advancements.  This element complicates business 
plans and renders the profitability of an envisioned activity 
questionable.  Third, the use of the near space and the EEZ creates 
safety and security concerns, particularly when foreign entities are 
involved.  Thus, it is of utmost importance to set up a system to 
manage operations so as to preserve national security interests and 
ensure the prevention of interference with pre-existing activities.  
Fourth, due to their peculiar physical characteristics, both 
environments naturally prefer the internationalization of their 
activities and services.  Indeed, due to the fact that several 
countries may lack the ability to undertake operation on their own, 
                                                             
 80 See UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 58(1), 87 (explaining that generally all 
states in the Exclusive Economic Zone are able to use the high seas for several 
purposes).  See generally UNCLOS, supra note 58, pt. VII (“High Seas”). 
 81 ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 56, at 93. 
 82 UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 58(3). 
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these countries may decide to open up the market to foreign 
entities. 
Thus, taking into account that states have successfully 
managed to agree on rules regulating the utilization of the EEZ, it 
seems plausible to consider those rules as valuable precedent for 
formulating a framework to manage the utilization of the near 
space.  Accordingly, the following elements of the EEZ regime are 
of particular significance: a) the use of the EEZ area for exclusively 
economic purposes; b) the promotion of the optimal use of 
resources; c) the sovereign right of the coastal state to manage and 
use its EEZ on a priority basis combined with the limited rights of 
other countries to participate in activities therein; d) the right of the 
coastal state to pass and enforce laws relating to activities 
occurring within its EEZ; and e) the preservation of safety, security, 
and order within an EEZ.  These elements constitute the core of the 
Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS) proposal. 
4.  THE EXCLUSIVE UTILIZATION SPACE 
4.1.  Why the exclusive utilization space? 
As described in the previous Sections, companies across the 
world are developing several vehicles capable of providing various 
services from the near space.  These vehicles are meant to be 
deployed both in the near space above their national territories as 
well as above the territory of foreign countries. 
Importantly, while the technology to carry out near space 
operations is making important leaps forward, the same cannot be 
said of the legal framework intended to regulate them, which 
remains uncertain.  The root of the problem is that no international 
treaty clearly defines and regulates the near space and its legal 
status.  As a matter of fact, several key questions remain 
unanswered, for example: What are the conditions to access and 
operate in the near space?  What kind of services may be provided 
therein?  How long may a foreign platform be placed over a 
foreign territory?  What kinds of measures may an underlying state 
take to preserve its national security interests? 
This uncertainty generates an unpredictable legal framework 
that negatively affects near space plans and discourages investors.  
Its detrimental impact is particularly noticeable in relation to 
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international activities.  Indeed, the placement of vehicles in the 
near space above foreign territories raises significantly higher 
safety and security concerns if compared with the placement of the 
same vehicles above national territory.  These concerns may 
eventually result in barriers to entering and conducting operations 
in a foreign near space. 
Overall, the present situation not only seems to discourage 
innovation, but it also does not create conditions that favor wide 
accessibility of services or the profitability of the planned activities.  
In an attempt to improve this state of being, one shall consider all 
available options.  The first option would be to leave the matter 
entirely in states’ hands without undertaking any international 
effort to ameliorate the uncertain status quo of the near space.  
Accordingly, each state would be entitled to independently 
regulate the use of the near space above its territory, including the 
activities undertaken by foreign entities, without setting up any 
internationally agreed rule.  While it is reasonable to envision that 
certain uses of the near space would be regulated domestically, this 
approach runs the risk of resulting in: a) a fragmented  legal 
framework governing near space activities; b) different conditions 
applicable to the same activity in different countries; c) market 
access restrictions; d) a somewhat unpredictable regulatory 
environment; e) inconsistent safety and security requirements 
applicable in different jurisdictions; and f) barriers to access near 
space services.  From a long-term perspective, this situation 
discourages investors and harms both domestic and international 
entities.  Indeed, for countries that do not possess near space 
technology, the presence of foreign near space vehicles above their 
territory might be the only way to benefit from near space services. 
An alternative option would be to deal with the legal regime of 
the near space at international level.  Ideally, this would result in 
the attribution of a new legal status for the near space: creating the 
Exclusive Utilization Space (EUS) and setting up basic rules 
governing activities therein.  Under this proposal, the near space 
would not be part of the national airspace, and it would be, at least 
in principle, accessible to domestic and foreign entities.  However, 
the state above which territory an EUS is placed would enjoy 
priority rights of utilization and the right to manage 
safety/security matters therein.  The EUS idea is inspired by the 
precedent of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  As explained in 
Section 3.2, the EEZ is an area of the sea adjacent to territorial 
waters that does not belong to the coastal state that declares it but 
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where such a state exercises sovereign rights of utilization and 
management.  Third-party countries benefit from several rights in 
another country’s EEZ, including the rights of overflight and access 
to the surplus of resources.  Similarly, under the concept of the 
EUS, the choice to establish an EUS would be of the underlying 
state.  If such a state decides to do so—while not being able to 
extend its sovereignty therein—it would enjoy special rights to 
administer, supervise, and manage the area, as well as the right to 
use it on a priority basis.  However, upon meeting certain 
conditions, foreign parties would be entitled to access and carry 
out activities in the near space. 
Notably, other scholars have recommended to confer a new 
status to the near space.  For instance, a scholar proposed to view 
the area extending from 21 to 160 km as the “protozone” to better 
regulate safety and security matters therein.83  Another proposal 
suggested to apply the legal regime of the high seas to the near 
space so as to enable innocent passage by all.84  The differences 
between these proposals and the EUS are that: 1) the EUS focuses 
on the economic aspects of the utilization of the near space; 2) it 
uses the EEZ as a precedent; and 3) it attempts to find a balance 
between the interests of the underlying state and foreign entities as 
far as the use of a certain near space is concerned.  It is the opinion 
of the present authors that endorsing the EUS idea would 
contribute to: a) enabling the broadest utilization of the near space; 
b) clarifying the rights and duties of the actors involved in its use; 
c) favoring its predictable and orderly management; d) stimulating 
industry growth; and e) favoring accessibility to near space 
services. 
4.2.  Main features of the Exclusive Utilization Space 
This Section introduces the main elements of the Exclusive 
Utilization Space proposal.  A much more detailed description is 
given in the next Section. 
                                                             
 83 See Pelton, supra note 21, at 3. 
 84 See DEMPSEY & MANOLI, supra note 13, at 44 (discussing the prospect of 
treating the near space as an intermediate region akin to the region between 
terrirorial seas and high seas under UNCLOS). 
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The main principles of the EUS proposal are the following: 
1. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be set up at an 
altitude between 18 to 100 km (59,005 to 328,083 feet) above 
sea level. 
2. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established for 
economic motives. 
3. An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established by the 
underlying state. 
4. An Exclusive Utilization Space should not belong to the 
territory of the state above which it is established. 
5. The rights of the underlying state over its national airspace 
shall not be undermined by the establishment of the 
Exclusive Utilization Space. 
6. The underlying state retains priority rights to use and 
manage the Exclusive Utilization Space established above 
its territory. 
7. The underlying state can enforce safety and security 
matters within the Exclusive Utilization Space established 
above its territory. 
8. The underlying state and the operator should agree on the 
conditions for deployment and operation of high-altitude 
platforms within an Exclusive Utilization Space prior to the 
commencement of operation. 
9. The state above which territory an Exclusive Utilization 
Space is established has the right to deny the deployment of 
foreign high-altitude platforms based on threats to its 
national security and safety interests. 
10. Third-party countries/foreign operators should be entitled 
to deploy their high-altitude platforms in a foreign 
Exclusive Utilization Space subject to prior notification and 
approval by the underlying state. 
11. Third-party countries/foreign operators are entitled to 
overfly a foreign Exclusive Utilization Space upon prior 
notification. 
12. A license is required to provide services from an Exclusive 
Utilization Space established above a foreign territory. 
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4.3.  Describing the Exclusive Utilization Space proposal 
4.3.1.  An Exclusive Utilization Space should be set up at an altitude 
between 18 to 100 km (59,005 to 328,083 feet) above sea level 
An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established at around 
the altitude between 18 to 100 km (59,005 to 328,083 feet) above sea 
level.  This spatial delimitation derives from the fact that the area 
represents an intermediate zone between the airspace and outer 
space.  On one side, commercial passenger aircrafts fly well below 
the 18 km mark (59,005 feet); also, air navigation services cannot be 
adequately provided beyond that point.  On the other side, the 100 
km (328,083 feet) level separates the airspace from outer space 
because above that altitude aerodynamic operations are no longer 
possible and space activities officially begin (even though satellites 
must be placed at a minimum altitude of 160 km or 524,934 feet).  
Although the area between the altitude of 18 to 100 km has 
remained largely un-utilized, several operators have ambitious 
plans to deploy their high-altitude platforms in that region.  Hence, 
it seems reasonable to reserve that area for the establishment of 
Exclusive Utilization Spaces. 
4.3.2.  An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established for 
economic motives 
The Exclusive Utilization Space proposal is intended to favor 
the use of the near space by domestic and foreign entities.  Until 
now, legal uncertainty, technological barriers, and limited 
economic incentives have slowed down progress in the near space.  
The goal of the EUS idea is to invert this trend by enabling legal 
certainty and favorable conditions for business plans.  Importantly, 
the focus of the proposal is to enable the economic use of the near 
space: a use aimed at providing commercial (paying) services to 
customers.  Other kinds of activities, such as scientific and military 
uses, are not included in the proposal. 
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4.3.3.  An Exclusive Utilization Space should be established by the 
underlying State 
The underlying state shall have the sole authority to establish 
an Exclusive Utilization Space above its territory.  This principle, 
which is of crucial relevance in the context of the EUS proposal, is 
the result of two considerations: 1) the need to preserve the 
national interests of the underlying state; 2) the sovereign and 
equal rights of states under international law.  First, even if we 
assume that the national airspace only extends up to an altitude of 
20 km, it goes without doubt that the presence of vehicles at 
altitudes beyond that level, especially when operated by foreign 
entities, poses potential risks to the fundamental rights of the 
underlying state.  Therefore, it seems intuitive to grant to that state 
the exclusive right to enable operations in the near space above its 
territory through the setting up of an EUS.  Second, two of the 
fundamental rights of states under international law are 
sovereignty85 and equality.86  Hence, no state can be forced to act in 
                                                             
 85 ”Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence” and 
“independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, 
to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” Island of Palmas (U.S. 
v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).  On the concept of sovereignty, see 
generally Sergio M. Carbone & Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, States, Fundamental 
Rights and Duties, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2009), Oxford Public International Law MPEPIL (discussing the ideas and 
philosophies behind basic concepts of sovereignty); Janice E. Thomson, State 
Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical 
Research, 39 INT’L STUD. Q. 213 (1995) (reviewing current research and discussing 
issues with empirical research on sovereignty); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 71–97 (2d ed. 2005). 
 86 According to the right to equality (or equal treatment), all states occupy 
the same position within the international community, have the same legal 
capacity, and bear equal rights and duties regardless of their size or power.  See 
generally G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) (declaring equality of sovereigns 
in the international community); Charter of the Organization of African Unity art. 
3, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (asserting the equality of all member sovereigns); 
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 
(declaring the AU’s accord with sovereign equality).  On the concept of equality, 
see James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 93 (1977) (discussing equality of sovereigns in the international legal 
community). 
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a manner contrary to its sovereign interests or that puts it in a 
disadvantageous position with respect to other countries, 
especially when security considerations are at stake.  
Consequently, no state can be obliged to set up an EUS above its 
territory if it does not choose to do so. 
4.3.4.  The Exclusive Utilization Space should not belong to the 
territory of the State above which it is established 
Similarly to the Exclusive Economic Zone, which does not 
belong to the coastal state that has established it, the Exclusive 
Utilization Space should not be included in the territory of the 
underlying state that has declared it.  Thus, although the portion of 
the airspace going from ground level up to an altitude of 18 km 
could be viewed as part of the national airspace of the underlying 
state, the same could not be said of the area ranging from 18 to 100 
km (59,005 to 328,083 feet), namely the EUS, which should not be 
considered part of a state’s territory, even though the underlying 
state should enjoy extensive rights to manage and use it.  This 
proposal is intended to mitigate the obstacles posed by sovereignty 
to the use of the near space, especially the barriers that foreign 
entities may face to access and provide services from a near space 
located above a foreign territory.  Indeed, even though these 
entities would have to comply with the operational conditions 
imposed by the underlying state, the absence of sovereignty- 
related considerations is more likely to favor a balance between the 
preservation of national interests and the (foreign) utilization of the 
near space. 
4.3.5.  The establishment of an Exclusive Utilization Space shall not 
undermine the rights of the underlying State over its national 
airspace 
The Exclusive Utilization Space’s proposal is not meant in any 
way to harm the sovereignty and the rights of a state within its 
national airspace.  Indeed, even if a state decides to set up an 
Exclusive Utilization Space above its territory, its authority to 
legislate over, administer, and control the activities taking place in 
the airspace up to an altitude of 18 km would remain untouched.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
568 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:3 
The underlying State will always have the ultimate power to 
suspend, modify, or terminate a near space operation that 
endangers its safety and security interests. 
4.3.6.  The underlying State retains priory rights to use and 
administer the Exclusive Utilization Space established above its 
territory 
The underlying state should enjoy sovereign rights to use and 
manage the Exclusive Utilization Space established above its 
territory on a priority basis; this means that, even if a state decides 
to set up an Exclusive Utilization Space, its ability to utilize that 
Space before any other subject should not be compromised.  This 
right can be either exclusive or inclusive.  In the first case, the 
underlying state does not allow other entities, either domestic or 
foreign, to operate therein, a decision which may derive from their 
inability to comply with safety and security requirements.  In the 
second case, the underlying state allows other states or entities to 
operate therein.  However, even in this situation, it should retain 
the right to supervise their activities and to ensure compliance with 
the contractual conditions agreed prior to the commencement of 
operations. 
4.3.7.  The underlying State is entitled to regulate and enforce safety 
and security matters within the Exclusive Utilization Space 
established above its territory 
The placement and operation of high-altitude vehicles, 
particularly those controlled by foreign entities, undoubtedly raises 
security and safety concerns for the underlying state. 
From a security perspective, the mostly stationary nature of 
these vehicles is troublesome because, in principle, they might be 
used to spy on sensitive facilities and areas such as governmental 
buildings and military bases.  High-altitude vehicles might also be 
used to coordinate and support operations detrimental to the 
sovereignty of the underlying state via communication links.  
There are also privacy issues to consider. 
From a safety perspective, the main concern is to ensure that 
near space activities do not interfere with pre-existing operations 
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and services.  First, the deployment and recovery of high-altitude 
vehicles shall be organized in a manner that poses no risk to air 
traffic or to the eventual launch of a space object.  Second, as high-
altitude vehicles are mostly meant to provide communication and 
internet services, it is crucial to make sure that these vehicles do 
not cause any harmful interference to pre-existing services. 
Based on these considerations, the underlying state shall have 
the right to set the safety and security requirements that an 
operator shall be able to comply with in order to be allowed to 
operate in the near space above its territory and to enforce them 
upon domestic and foreign entities.  Failure to comply with such 
requirements might result in temporary suspension, revision or 
termination of the activities. 
4.3.8.  The underlying State and the operator should agree on the 
conditions for deployment and operation of high-altitude 
platforms prior to the commencement of operations 
Any foreign or domestic entity willing to provide services from 
an Exclusive Utilization Space shall agree with the underlying state 
about the conditions to operate therein before the activities begin.  
The underlying state must evaluate the potential negative impact 
of the proposed operations on national security and safety interests 
as well as on the rights of its citizens.  To do so, the operator 
should submit a plan detailing the nature, duration and purpose of 
its planned activities.  Only after a thorough review of the plan and 
an assessment of the technical and financial soundness of the 
applicant might the underlying state authorize commencement of 
the operations.  Such an authorization might take the form of a 
license.  However, it is entirely up to each state to determine how 
to structure the authorization process.  The bottom line is that 
high-altitude vehicles, especially when owned by foreign entities, 
cannot be deployed in an Exclusive Utilization Space without 
obtaining prior authorization from the underlying state. 
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4.3.9.  The state above which territory an Exclusive Utilization Space 
is established has the right to deny the deployment of foreign 
high-altitude platforms based on threat to its national security 
and safety interests. 
When near space services are undertaken by foreign entities, 
preserving national security interests, avoiding harmful 
interferences and other safety hazards is of paramount importance.  
Indeed, safety and security concerns may lead the underlying state 
to reject the foreign entity’s plan to provide services from the near 
space located above its territory.  In the most likely scenario, the 
underlying state might make this decision after deeming the 
operator incapable of satisfying safety and security requirements.  
The underlying state should, however, notify the entity of the 
reasons for the denial and give the opportunity to address them. 
4.3.10.  Third-party countries/foreign operators should be entitled to 
deploy their high-altitude platforms in a foreign Exclusive 
Utilization Space subject to prior notification and approval by 
the underlying state. 
When a foreign entity intends to provide services from an 
Exclusive Utilization Space located above another country’s 
territory, it shall notify its intention to do so to the underlying state 
and submit an operational plan.  A violation of this rule, especially 
the unannounced deployment of high-altitude vehicles, would 
constitute a breach of the underlying state’s rights and a threat to 
its national security interests.  In this event, the underlying state 
would have the right to take all necessary measures to react to this 
behavior.  However, if the foreign entity/state has acted according 
to the above principles, it should be entitled to deploy its vehicles 
and provide the proposed services, unless provable and serious 
motives exist, such as financial issues or safety and security 
concerns.  The advantageous position attributed to foreign entities 
is justifiable under the following grounds: First, the goal of 
Exclusive Utilization Space’s proposal is to promote the broadest 
use of the near space, particularly in countries which lack the 
capability to do so.  Consequently, the advantage conferred to 
(foreign) entities is meant to encourage them to enter the near 
space business and to offer services to any interested customer 
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worldwide.  Second, it is likely that prior to the commencement of 
operations, the underlying state and the foreign entity have 
discussed the possibility of the latter providing near space services 
to the former.  Based on these discussions, the foreign entity might 
have invested technological and financial resources to develop the 
necessary capabilities to undertake those services.  Thus, once the 
capabilities are mature, if the review of the operational plan is 
positive, there seems to be little reason for that entity to be refused 
the right to deploy its vehicles in a foreign Exclusive Utilization 
Space.  Importantly, even when the plan is approved, the foreign 
entity should always comply with the operational conditions and 
licensing requirements set out by the underlying state.  Thirdly, the 
establishment of an Exclusive Utilization Space is a clear indication 
of the underlying state’s willingness to promote the use of the near 
space above its territory and to attract all interested entities, 
including the foreign ones. 
The possibility to deploy high-altitude platforms assumes 
particular relevance in relation to projects aimed at building 
communication networks across several countries.  In this context, 
an entity from State A might be willing to place broadband 
transceivers in the near space above State B to provide services to 
States C and D.  The deployment of these kinds of transceivers 
raises limited security and safety concerns from the perspective of 
State B, the underlying state.  Therefore, in these cases, it seems 
limiting the ground for that state to oppose these projects is 
warranted, especially if the entity has notified the state of its plan 
and demonstrated technical reliability. 
4.3.11.  Third-party countries/foreign operators should enjoy the 
right to overfly a foreign Exclusive Utilization Space upon prior 
notification. 
Despite their mostly stationary nature, some high-altitude 
vehicles possess a certain degree of maneuverability.  Foreign 
entities should then be entitled to transit their high-altitude 
vehicles through a foreign Exclusive Utilization Space provided 
that the underlying state is notified in advance. 
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4.3.12.  A license is required to provide services from an EUS 
established above a foreign territory 
When considering near space activities, two types of licenses 
can be envisioned: 1) a license to launch and operate a high-
altitude vehicle; and 2) a license to provide near space services.  
The first one will be issued by the state in which the entity is 
registered which we may label State A.  The state responsible to 
issue the second license is the one where the services are provided.  
If the services are expected to be offered within State A, State A 
would be in charge of issuing both licenses.  Instead, if the entity 
intends to provide services to a third country, for instance State B, 
it would be the responsibility of State B to grant a service license.  
Obviously, State B would issue such a license if it deems the 
proposed activity not detrimental to its national security interests.  
The license would then include a series of requirements to prevent 
harmful interferences with pre-existing services as well as the 
modalities to supervise the licensed operations.  Furthermore, the 
licensing authority would be entitled to demand an annual fee 
from the licensee.  This kind of licensing system is not uncommon.  
For example, in the context of the licensing of a mega-constellation 
of satellites, the Federal Communications Commission has recently 
granted OneWeb access to the U.S. communication market.87  Since 
OneWeb is a U.K.-based company, the launch of its satellites must 
be authorized by the United Kingdom.88  However, in order to 
                                                             
 87 See WorldVu Satellites Limited, 32 FCC Rcd. 5366 (2017) (granting a 
declaratory ruling regarding the conditions under which WorldVu will be 
allowed to enter the U.S. market); see also Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 
FCC Grants OneWeb U.S. Access for Broadband Satellite Constellation (2017), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-345467A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TR9-XFN2] (announcing the grant of U.S. access to 
WorldVu). 
 88 According to Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a non-
governmental entity willing to undertake space activities must be authorized and 
continuously supervised by an appropriate state.  See Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI, Apr. 22, 1968, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (establishing the criteria for permitting NGOs to undertake 
space activities); see also F.G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorization: Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law, in 6 STUDIES IN SPACE LAW 3–28 
(F.G. von der Dunk ed., 2011) (discussing Article VI). 
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provide broadband services using satellite technologies in the 
United States, it requires a license to do so by the competent U.S. 
authority. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Near space activities are the future of aerospace operations.  
Considering that these activities are envisioned to be profitable, 
several non-governmental entities have entered the near space 
business with the goal of offering services on a domestic and 
international basis. 
Despite these positive factors, the uncertain legal status of the 
near space still slows down the realization of near space activities 
on a large scale.  This uncertainty particularly harms international 
activities involving vehicles placed above a foreign near space.  
This situation may not only lead some entities to renounce their 
near space ambitions, but may also affect customers, who could be 
deprived of otherwise unavailable services. 
In order to overcome these obstacles and to enable accessibility 
of services, this Article has suggested a new classification of the 
near space as the Exclusive Utilization Space.  At its core, the EUS 
proposal attempts to balance the rights of the state above which 
territory an EUS is established—the underlying state—and the 
interests of the entities willing to provide near space services.  On 
one hand, while the EUS should not belong to the underlying state, 
such a state should retain sovereign and priory rights of utilization 
and management therein.  On the other hand, domestic and 
especially foreign entities, upon meeting safety and security 
requirements, should have the opportunity to deploy their vehicles 
and to provide services.  The EUS proposal is not meant to 
undermine the legal position of the underlying state, which has the 
exclusive authority to set up an EUS above its land as well as the 
right to lay down the operation conditions to be complied with by 
operators. 
The Authors of this Article are aware of the controversial and 
still embryonic nature of the EUS proposal.  Furthermore, this 
proposal might need some refinement and a greater level of 
specificity before being applied in practice.  Nonetheless, the 
ultimate goal of this Article is to draw attention to the legal issues 
surrounding the near space and to encourage the international 
community to engage in discussions about developing a regulatory 
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framework to govern activities therein.  In this respect, a possible 
forum for this discussion could be the ICAO, which has already 
showed interest in addressing and possibly regulating aerospace 
matters, as demonstrated by the recent establishment of the ICAO 
Space Learning Group. 
We conclude with the hope that the near space era will bring 
benefits to the broadest number of users, especially civilians, and 
will contribute to broader access to services and better conditions 
across the globe. 
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